With Greece eliciting full uncertainty across the global financial complex, it isn’t unsurprising to see “dollar” proxies indicating tightness in almost uniform fashion. There isn’t as much a cascade, yet, as there had been in early October and early December last year, but the movement has finally coalesced. The “dollar” world had begun what looks in hindsight a slow turn two months ago. With Greece as the likely central catalyst, European banks are probably leading with increasing volatility estimates, reigning back liquidity including and especially in the global “dollar” short.

Copper, which had first picked up the rising angst, is back down to where it was near the low of early February – selling off especially hard this morning as the “dollar” accelerated.

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar Copper

Not far behind was the previously complacent crude oil curve, as both WTI and Brent are retracing the “dollar on” period in quick succession. WTI after spending almost two months in sideways and rather uninteresting trading (which is actually suspiciously interesting) is now seeing the entire curve pulled rather bearishly lower – not with huge contango this time, as opposed to the first part of the downtrend, but as a steady and straight curve influence.

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar WTI Curve

In my view, that more than suggests heavy and stated “dollar” problems that intermingle with what Greece might suggest, in the darkest of expectations, for an already problematic global economic environment. I don’t think it gets any clearer than this, especially the inflection:

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar WTI SpotABOOK July 2015 Dollar WTI Curve Recent

Apart from commodities as “dollar” proxies, the global financial indications are roundly in agreement with the direction if not yet the magnitude. The eurodollar curve has sunk in the front end at a heavy pace in the past few days, which is, again, the antithesis of Fed-driven “tightening” intentions and expectations. That the eurodollar curve has grown steeper in comparison suggests that money dealing agents are more enthused about what might happen if that short end interpretation holds up; less Fed suicidal tendencies that just may allow the economy to sort out this “slump” and storm without additional negative monetary upset.

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar Eurofutures

We still see the major currencies showing the upward “dollar” bias, though again not quite at a running pace. For those currency systems, however, there isn’t much distinction now at this level in how fast depressive money pressures induce decay. Several currencies, such as the real and ruble, remain not much different than the worst days of the past year.

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar RubleABOOK July 2015 Dollar Real

Even the Indian rupee, relatively calm by comparison, is not all that far from stretching the bounds of good order, nearing the mid-2013 lows that nearly sunk the economy then. In other words, despite all the major moves and changes enacted by the Reserve Bank of India to “rectify” what it viewed as currency imbalance, the “dollar” is mostly its own problem unaccustomed to orthodox pressures.

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar Rupee

What may be most significant is gold. You would think with Greece threatening the stability of the euro system if not, once more, the euro itself that gold would be steadily and quickly bid across the developed world with exposure to these vast linkages. Instead, gold is back down to a multi-month low, which, in the interbank “collateral of last resort” template, more than suggests that “dollar” problems are overwhelming any tendency toward that safety bid. This is not unusual under such conditions, but I think that it underscores the nature, the breadth and scope really, of what may be taking place inside “dollar” interchange conditions.

ABOOK July 2015 Dollar Gold

It is, then, interesting that the commodity proxies are moving faster and farther, on net, than the financials. That may suggest the negative interchange between even measured “dollar” tightening and uncertain economic conditions more broadly as being more prominent in the physical clearing reality of those assets. The financials, for their part, seem to note good concern over what may be coming but at least good order in carrying it out. Such complacency may well in the end be warranted, especially if Greece finds itself further (and temporarily again) wrestled into complacency within the euro. The danger, as suggested at least at the contours of the commodity agents, is if those middling expectations aren’t even met and “contagion” represses even in a slightly resembling manner to 2011.

I don’t think it should be understated the level of global “dollar” illiquidity as a matter almost purely of systemic capacity. While such complacency holds, liquidity may yet hold, but the recent past is not kind about when that short-term paradigm fails. It was never really about Greece, as this is one small penetration of the much larger emplacement of central banks supposedly taking apart and managing “tail risks.” The financial and “dollar” system as it has been since QE3 is thus quite threatened; the dealers are already walking away with little remaining of the pre-crisis foundation and nothing left or ready to fill that gap. Only the lack of sustained and heavy selling has prevented a rout (and only inside the US and partly Europe; China, Brazil, Switzerland, etc., have all had close experience with what’s left of the eurodollar standard).

Greece may never push it that far, but the fault lines are again quite visible.