At the end of April 2015, the Commerce Department reported that unadjusted durable goods shipments (ex transportation) had totaled $177.6 billion in the month of March 2015. That represented just a half of one percent year-over-year gain, but at a crucial moment in economic history the plus sign was quite welcome for the attempt at the “transitory” narrative. That estimate, however, was made using a benchmark process set the year earlier, one that didn’t fully incorporate the 2012 Economic Census.

There have been three annual benchmark revisions since that time, each pushing the estimate lower and lower. The latest, the May 2017 set of revisions, now figures durable good shipments contracted by 1.4% that pivotal March. It may not seem like much of a difference +0.5% to -1.4%, but that is only because we cannot straight away conceive of the effect in non-linear fashion, the absence of compounding.

A better way to start describing the change is by referencing just the size disparity then to now. As stated above, in April 2015 using the benchmark set in May 2014 it was believed durable good shipments were $177.6 billion; a month later, also for March 2015, the new estimates suggested it was only $171.7 billion; a year after that, $164.5 billion; and as of today, $162.8 billion. That’s a difference of nearly $15 billion for one single month. You can’t ignore almost 10% of activity that never happened. 

What that means is not that durable goods contracted by that amount, but that amount very likely never existed. Thus, the economy of +0.5% and $177.6 billion in March 2015 looks very different from -1.4% at just $162.8 billion. The “rising dollar” was much worse than it appeared at first because these statistics are not made for these circumstances. It really is that simple. There are subjective processes embedded within their construction that make sense to the point of never being noticed during so-called normal times. We are so far from normal that we have to wait each additional year to discover just how far, only to wonder how much more might be subtracted next year at the next benchmark (while further wondering why the Commerce Department can’t be more accurate before remembering the inflexible and unscientific principles of orthodox Economics).

The total cumulative revisions are, when put together, staggering. Going back to 2011, the difference between the May 2015 and May 2014 benchmarks was $215 billion:

At the next benchmark, almost a quarter trillion:

And even the latest, more than a year after the (as of now) trough, another $56 billion in activity has disappeared:

Altogether, for the last three revisions, the cumulative amount of vanished durable goods shipments is more than half a trillion:

Though they stretch back six years, the vast majority of the reductions are of the last few, $345 billion from January 2014 onward.

These revisions amount to a much weaker economic picture on the two counts that matter; for durable goods and therefore manufacturing, the past few years were of much more contraction than thought, and the last year less improvement. You can have the same growth rates, or largely so, in the May 2017 benchmark series as the May 2016 for the past fourteen months on the upswing, but starting from a lower base makes for a significant difference.

What was once thought just three years ago kind of like a recovery has since been revised to the narrative we have been telling since 2012. The level of activity in durable goods since the 2012 slowdown is a meandering, low amplitude change between elongated shallow contraction and elongated positive numbers. The latter may at times seem like improvement but when viewed altogether what you find is really the absence of any. The economy just goes nowhere. It is not growth but also not quite recession(s), therefore by its cumulative nature it is clearly just depression.

In non-linear terms, sideways even slightly upward is contraction; and it only gets worse the longer this condition continues. In many ways it is worse than purely these numbers, as because none of this is ever reported in the mainstream. People think the 4.5% unemployment rate is an accurate depiction of our current economic condition because they aren’t given these reasons (among others) why it isn’t or wasn’t. Having been told all throughout about “strong” consumers and whatnot, these reductions do matter.

What we find here and throughout these benchmark changes is that as bad as the unemployment rate was at describing the economy, its misleading tendency has only grown over time especially as it suggests things are getting much better when in fact we find out afterward they have always been much worse.

The revisions were not, of course, limited to just the shipments portion of durable goods. All the categories have been subjected to serious and sustained downgrades, this disappearing of economic activity well after the fact that explains a lot about why 2017 is so disappointing at the same time nobody can quite figure out why.